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1 Introduction
It is an undeniable empirical fact that the economy aﬀects election outcomes
as well as partiess monthly popularity ratings. Party fortunes alternate with
economic up- and downturns. Incumbent parties are found especially vul-
nerable to changes in unemployment although the changes would be of the
volume of a normal business cycle. Aim of this study is to examine how dra-
matic changes in the economy, especially in unemployment, inßuence the
party popularities. The depression of the 1990s in Finland and Sweden was
not only an economic phenomena, but it also transformed the society as a
whole. The change is most visible in the permanent increase of the unem-
ployment level. After the immediate crisis, it was structural unemployment
that was left. Besides the inßuence of unemployment on the popularities,
our aim is to Þnd a threshold point for unemployment in which the eﬀect of
unemployment changes its direction.
The idea of election outcome being a result of incumbents performance
originates in Downs (1957). In the Downsian world voter and government
maximize their utilities. The government tries to please the voter to get
reelected and the voter holds the government responsible for its economic
policy. The voter shows his/her trust (distrust) by voting for the incum-
bent (voting against it). Elections are like referendums on the incumbents
economic performance. Downs called this pattern responsibility hypothesis.
Hibbs (1977) complemented the responsibility hypothesis by adding diﬀerent
issue-priorities to the left-wing and the right-wing parties. The issue-priority
(or partisan) hypothesis holds that the left-wing parties are more concerned
for the unemployment and the right-wing parties for the inßation.
There are some institutional requirements for the Downsian voting: clear
patterns of accountability and the voters have to be able to get the under-
achievers out of oﬃce with their vote. The incumbents have to have incen-
tives for reelection and the opposition has to have a credible role (and it must
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exist). The Downsian thinking still has some unanswered questions when it
comes to unexpected changes in the economy and unintended consequences
of policy actions. How should the voter react when the incumbents devia-
tion from the promised policy increases the voters welfare? Is it reasonable
to punish the incumbent for the deviation if the reason for the deviation is
an exogenous shock? Some kind of an answer to this question is given in
Alesina, Roubini and Cohen (1997, p.35) where they write a naive voter
would punish an unlucky incumbent, whereas a rational voter would, at least
in part, take bad luck into consideration. These questions are relevant for
this study as it is unsure if the politicians were aware of the true shape of
the economy before the Finnish parliamentary elections in 1991 (Vartia and
Kiander p. 65, 1998). There are also features in the political structures
of Finland and Sweden that weaken the Downsian theory. In Finland, in
1991-95 we have had two multi-party governments consisting two left-wing
parties, a green party, a right-wing party and a liberal party. In Sweden,
the incumbency of the social democratic one-party minority government has
continued since 1994. One-party minority government is forced to rely on
the help of the opposition parties when passing legislation. Thus, it is not
only the incumbent that is responsible for the results.
In addition, this study approaches another weakness of the Downsian
theory - the assumption of two party system. We try to shed light on the
question of how the incumbent parties are treated in a coalition government.
Do the cabinet positions held by the party count or is it something else that
leads to fame and blame? Whom to punish when almost all the relevant
parties are included in the government coalition? In that case, is it issue-
priorities of the parties that decide the approval?
The Þrst studies (Kramer, 1971, Mueller, 1970, Goodhart and Bhansali,
1970) empirically connecting party, presidential or congressional populari-
ties to the economic development applied data of two-party systems. Since
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the beginning of the 1970s, the research has widened to cover almost all
relevant countries and party systems. In addition, the questions posed have
changed from the existence of the connection to more delicate ones. The
latest Finnish and Swedish studies on vote (Sweden: Jordahl, 2001) and
popularity function (Finland: Nyberg, 1999, Mattila, 1994) provide support
for the responsibility hypothesis. Before that the Swedish government pop-
ularity has been found to be inßuenced by inßation and unemployment (Jo-
nung and Wadensjö, 1979) or just by unemployment (Lybeck, 1985, Hibbs
and Madsen, 1981). In a multi-country study (Denmark, Finland, Norway,
Sweden) on the government popularity, it is concluded that the economy
has the stronger inßuence the fewer incumbent parties there are (Mattila,
1996). Using the same country set it is also concluded that especially the
vote for the leftist parties depends on the success of the economy (Pacek
and Radcliﬀ, 1999).
This study essentially diﬀers from the previous studies as the focus here
is on the eﬀect of the depression on the party popularities. It is interesting to
see whether this extraordinary period makes visible diﬀerence to the party
popularities. More speciÞcally the following hypotheses are set:
1. In the beginning of the 1990s Finland and Sweden experienced the
deepest peacetime depression. Economy gained attention in the media
and it is assumed that the inßuence of the economy on the party
popularity varies in 1987-2001. It is assumed that the economic crisis
changes the punishment pattern. We wish to Þnd out whether all the
government parties are treated similarly what comes to economy.
2. During the deepest phase of the depression both countries were gov-
erned by the right-wing governments. Nevertheless, the economic poli-
cies to handle the crisis were diﬀerent in these countries. Most clearly
it is reßected in the development of unemployment. In Sweden un-
employment never rose above 10%, whereas in Finland unemployment
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rate increased to around 18%. In Finland unemployment has stayed
high since the depression years. Unemployment rate is assumed to re-
ßect the diﬀerences in economic policies in these countries. Thus, the
question is whether the incumbents of 1991-95 are treated diﬀerently
in the two countries?
3. If the regression coeﬃcients vary from subperiod to another, as hypoth-
esis 1 suggests, we try catch this variation by Þtting a threshold model
to each popularity regression. Further, we assume that the threshold,
which divides the data into two regimes, is a result of large changes in
unemployment. In the threshold point the inßuence of unemployment
on the party popularity alternates its sign and/or signiÞcance. This
gives us an opportunity to test how high unemployment has to rise to
change the way poll respondents view a certain party.
In the following, the political structures in Finland and Sweden are
shortly described. After that an outline of the depression is sketched. The
popularity function and the test hypothesis are presented next and the rest
of the paper explains the results.
2 Similarities in Political Structure and Economic
Development
2.1 Political Structure
The Finnish and Swedish politico-economic structures are quite alike. Both
countries are Nordic welfare states and the maintenance of the welfare state
means high tax rates and thus small income diﬀerences. Characteristic is also
consensual procedures in the political system, a high-level of social security,
a high organization rate in the labor market, a high share of government in
GDP and a stable political system. Party structure consists of Þve party
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types: leftist, social democratic, agrarian, liberal and rightist. In addition,
typical is the high the vote share and the popularity of the Social Democratic
parties. The popularities of the four biggest parties are shown in Figures 1
and 2.
Until 1991, Finland was governed by the Social Democratic Party and the
National Coalition, Sweden by the Social Democratic Party. After that both
countries were governed for 3-4 years by the right-wing governments. The
right-wing governments coincided with the deepest phase of the crisis and
the incumbent coalitions changed in both countries after the crisis. Sweden
returned to the Social Democratic one-party minority government. After
the crisis Finland was governed by the so-called rainbow coalition including
parties from the left to the right and also the Greens and missing only one
big party, namely the Centre Party. The incumbent parties are listed in
Table 1.
Table 1. Government parties1 in Finland and Sweden.
Finland Sweden
1987-91 NC, SDP, SSPP, FRP 1987-90 SDP
1991-95 NC, CENT, SSPP, CD 1991-94 MP, CENT, LP, CD
1995-99 NC, SDP, LA, GL, SSPP 1994-98 SDP
1999-> NC, SDP, LA, GL, SSPP 1998- > SDP
To be able to compare the eﬀects of the economic variables on the party
popularities in two countries, the parties must be ideologically close to each
other. As is seen in Table 2. the biggest parties in Finland and Sweden
rank close to each other on the left-right scale in 1970-1990 (Gilljam and
Oscarsson, 1996). These ratings suggest that the popularity changes of also
1NC (National Coalition), SSPP (Swedish Speaking Peoples Party), SDP (Social
Democratic Party), FRP (Finnish Rural Party), CP (Finnish Centre Party/Centre
Party), LA (Left Alliance), GL (Green League), MP (Moderate Party), LP (Liberal
Party), CD (Christian Democratic Party/Christian Democrats).
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other parties than the Social Democratic Parties can be compared.
Table 2. Party positions on the left-right scale2.
Party Finland Sweden
Left Alliance/Left Party 1.8 2.6
Social Democratic Party 3.7 3.9
Centre Party 5.4 6.1
National Coalition/Moderate Party 7.5 7.5
2.2 Economic Crisis of the 1990’s3
The cyclical behavior in Finland and Sweden has always been highly corre-
lated due to the similar production structure. The economic crisis was by far
deeper in Finland than it was in Sweden but the following crisis outline Þts
to both countries. Typical of the crisis was that nobody could forecast the
huge decline in the economic growth. Further, it was a combination of bad
luck and bad policies (Honkapohja and Koskela, 1999). The depression had
its roots in the overheated economy of the end of the 1980s. Deregulation of
capital and credit markets began in the mid-1980s. New regulation allowed
foreign debt also for households and non-exporting Þrms. Saving rate ap-
proached zero and consumer expectations were optimistic, Þscal policy was
not particularly restrictive. Tax deductible interest payments for households
and companies favored debt Þnancing of consumption and investment. For
the above mentioned reasons and also because the export demand decreased
as a consequence of the world-wide economic downturn and the collapse of
the former Soviet Union, the current account deÞcit grew and after a while
it became a problem. The maintenance of the Þxed exchange rates while
2On the scale 1 denotes the farthest position on the left and 10 the farthest
position on the right.
3This chapter is based on Holmlund (2002), Honkapohja and Koskela (1999), Lindbeck
(1997) and Vartia and Kiander (1998).
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experiencing current account deÞcits and devaluation expectations, lead the
central banks to increase interest rates.
The interest rate increase and the later inevident devaluation lead many
debtors to sell their properties, which yielded to deßation, especially on the
real estate market. Unsound company Þnancing produced bankruptcies and
credit losses. Unemployment increased, economic growth decreased and the
banking crisis realized. In welfare states, the balancing eﬀect of automatic
stabilizers accumulated public sector debt.
At the same time as the crisis took its Þrst steps, Finland and Sweden
aimed at abandoning the Nordic inßation model and competing devalua-
tions4. Following Sweden, Finland pegged markka on ecu in June 1991 at
the prevailing exchange rate. Because of the current account deÞcits, high
foreign debt, rising unemployment and Þxed exchange rate, the Þnancial
markets lost its conÞdence in the countries ability to cope with the crisis.
The currencies pegged on ecu were attacked in Autumn 1991. Next time
markka was under a serious attack in the EMS crisis in September 1992.
Then markka was allowed to ßoat and Sweden devalued krona two months
later. These devaluations helped the export industries to lead the economies
from the crisis.
Despite the similar causes of the crisis, stabilization policy and recov-
ery have been diﬀerent in Finland and Sweden. In both countries tight
Þscal policy was part of the new economic policy paradigm which aimed at
reaching the EU membership convergence criteria. In Finland, the govern-
ment downsized its Þnancing of municipals, which led to cuts in the public
services.
4 In the 1960-90s, both countries exploited the opportunity to devaluate their currencies
when the competitiveness of the export industries decreased. This is the so-called Nordic
inßation model. If interested, see Jacobsson, 2003.
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Figure 1.The Finnish party popularities.
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Figure 2. The Swedish party popularities.
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In Sweden, they had a policy decision to avoid cuts in the public services.
In Finland, cutbacks in the public expenditures had higher weight than
tax increases in the consolidation policy. In Sweden, the two policies had
Þfty-Þfty shares in the stabilization policy. In Finland, the cutbacks and
the public saving decisions were mostly made in the early 1990s by the
right-wing government, but in Sweden in 1994-95 by the Social Democratic
government. (Kautto, 2001) In Sweden, the government indebted more to
Þnance the welfare services. Thus, the average-Swede did not suﬀer so much
of the economic crisis. Unemployment started to decline faster in Finland
than in Sweden. Nevertheless, open unemployment never rose above 10%
in Sweden, whereas in Finland it reached almost 20%. The Finnish and
Swedish unemployment rates are plotted in Figure 3.
The nature of unemployment changed over the years as the production
technology experienced a structural change. The leading role of paper, pulp
and metal industries was gradually taken over by electronic industry. The
latter needs diﬀerent kind of abilities and schooling than the metal and
paper industry and that has led to a high level of structural unemployment.
Service industry has also played a big part in the creation of new jobs.
(Koskela and Uusitalo, 2003) The depression brought the economy into the
public focus at least for a decade.
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Figure 3. Seasonally adjusted Finnish and Swedish unemployment rates.
3 Estimation of the Popularity Equation
3.1 Linear Model
We begin by estimating a linear regression model for the whole period and
then divide the data into three subperiods, namely before-the-crisis, the
crisis and after-the-crisis periods. Due to the large changes in the unem-
ployment rate, we assume that the inßuence of economic variables on the
popularity ratings diﬀers from period to period. The popularity function
has the standard linear autoregressive formulation as follows
(1) Pt = β0+β1Pt−1+β2It+β3Ut+
Pp
i=1 β4iPolit+
Pg
i=1 β5iGDit+Pr
i=1 β6iTit + εt.
On the left hand side there is the popularity (Pt) of the party in question
( Finnish: Left Alliance, Social Democratic Party, Centre Party, National
Coalition Party, Swedish: Left Party, Social Democratic Party, Centre Party,
Moderate Party) and on the right hand side is its Þrst lag (Pt−1) with other
explanatory economic and political variables5.
5The Finnish popularity ratings are from Taloustutkimus, the Swedish from SIFO.
Economic data is from OECD Statistics for both countries.
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Unemployment and economic growth are essential indicators of the deep-
ness of the economic crisis but including both in the same regression equation
may create correlation problems. Thus, only unemployment (U) is included.
Both seasonally adjusted and non-seasonally adjusted unemployment rates
are tested. Inßation (I) is a 12-month change in the cost of living index. Lags
in the economic variables are chosen to give the best Þt for every regression.
The popularity regression is completed with political variables (Polit) which
highlight the signiÞcance of atypical, one-time political events like changes
of party leader, referendums and municipal elections. Most political events
are coded as dummies which creates asymmetry in the explanatory power
between the economic and the political variables. The incumbency periods
are denoted by dummies (GDit). Time-related variables (Tit) expose trends,
cycles and abrupt changes in the popularity levels. A trend variable is cre-
ated for the Left Alliance to detect the universal fall in the popularity of the
leftist ideology. The popularity regressions for each party are estimated sep-
arately. All tested economic and political variables that did not reach any
level signiÞcance are listed in Appendix in Tables 1 and 2. Below the tables
is a list of tested economic variables that did not have signiÞcant inßuence
on the party popularities.
The focus is to examine how the atypical economic circumstances change
the relationship between the economy and the party approval rates. Overall,
it is assumed that unemployment has a more decisive role in the popularity
changes than inßation and this should hold for all the parties. It is assumed
that the eﬀect of unemployment is larger for the Finnish parties than for the
Swedish parties simply because unemployment increased in Finland faster
and to a higher level than it did in Sweden. This larger inßuence should
be more pronounced in the crisis period, especially the incumbent parties
should be punished. Another expected diﬀerence in the results between
the countries is that the incumbents should not be so severely punished in
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Sweden as in Finland. To examine the changes in the economy-popularity
relationship we apply the subperiods, which roughly coincide with the in-
cumbency periods. The exact periods and numbers of observations in each
period are shown in Table 3. As the depression was deeper than any down-
turn experienced in peacetime, there is a possibility that the results do not
support any traditional hypothesis.
Table 3. The exact subperiods and numbers of observations in each period.
Period N, Finland N, Sweden
9/1987-9/1990 32 36
10/1990-9/1995 53 55
10/1995-10/2001 63 67
Total 148 158
3.2 Results on the Linear Model
3.2.1 Finnish Results
Our estimation method for the linear model is OLS. In reporting the results
we move from Finland to Sweden and from whole period to subperiods. Sev-
eral well-known hypothesis get support in these estimations. The main result
is that both unemployment and inßation inßuence negatively the populari-
ties of the right-wing parties and positively the popularities of the left-wing
parties. Unemployment has a statistically signiÞcant coeﬃcient at the level
of 0.01 in all the estimations except in the Centre Partys regression. Inßa-
tion has signiÞcant eﬀect on the National Coalitions and the Left Alliances
popularity, the level of signiÞcance are 0.01 and 0.1, respectively. Unem-
ployment has stronger inßuence than inßation on the Left Alliances and
the Social Democratic Partys popularity, the opposite situation emerges in
the National Coalitions regression. Thus, the inßuence of unemployment
on party popularities follows the issue-priority hypothesis. The National
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Coalition suﬀers from the general cost of ruling and, maybe, from holding
the post of Þnancial minister since 1991.
A closer look at the periodwise results shows that the signs and sig-
niÞcances of economic variables vary from period to period. Between 1.
(1987-90) and 2. (1990-95) periods the signs of unemployment and inßation
coeﬃcients changed in 7 cases of 8. The only signiÞcant variable, which
does not change its negative sign and level of signiÞcance (0.05) every pe-
riod, is the unemployment in the Centre Partys popularity function. As
we recall, in the results for the whole period the Centre Partys popular-
ity is not signiÞcantly inßuenced by the economic variables. The negative
inßuence is surely due to the incumbency of 1991-95 and holding of the
Prime Ministers post. It has been found in several studies that the Prime
Ministers party gets the most blame of the incumbency and that is seen in
these results, too. In the period of the right-wing government, the Centre
Party is stronger punished for the rise in unemployment than is its coalition
partner, the National Coalition. An interesting feature in these results is
that the National Coalition has been incumbent continuously, but until the
third period is punished for the unemployment to a lesser degree than its
main coalition partner, either the Social Democratic Party or the Centre
Party. After the crisis period the Social Democratic Party held the Prime
Ministers post but is not signiÞcantly punished for governing. Reason for
that may lie in the remarkable and fast recovery from the crisis that started
after 1994.
Most political variables tested (listed in Appendix in Tables 1 and 2) were
not signiÞcant. One variable having signiÞcance in two estimation equations
is 10/96 -variable. In October 1996, we had several one-time events that may
have shifted party approvals: 1. Markka joined the ERM system with Þxed
exchange rate. 2. The Social Democratic Partys minister was suspected on
information leaks in the ERM negotiations weakening Finlands position. 3.
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There was municipal elections where the usual winner is the Centre Party.
The results show that after all these events the right-wing parties popu-
larities increased. Other political and event dummies reaching signiÞcance
were trend variable (Left Alliance), change of the party leader ( positive in-
ßuence on the Social Democratic Party), the membership application for the
European Union (negative inßuence on the Social Democratic Party) and
the Centre Partys labor market reform proposal (a suggestion to increase
ßexibility in labor market had negative inßuence on the popularity).
In general, incumbency decreases signiÞcantly partys popularity despite
the politics carried on. In two cases the inßuence was in contrast with the
usual hypothesis. In 1987-91, the Social Democratic Partys incumbency
increases its support and the Left Alliance is favored by being incumbent
since 1999.
3.2.2 Swedish Results
In the results for the whole period remarkable is that there are only two
statistically signiÞcant coeﬃcients. Namely, inßation decreases signiÞcantly
(at level 0.1) the Social Democratic Partys popularity and unemployment
signiÞcantly (at level 0.01) increases the Moderate Partys popularity. The
results are in contrast with the standard issue-priority hypothesis. The
results do not change much when the same equations are estimated on the
subdivided data: most of the time the Social Democratic Party is punished
for unemployment and inßation and the Moderate Party is rewarded. The
economic variables have positive eﬀect on the right-wing parties popularity,
except for the negative coeﬃcient for unemployment in the Þrst period in
the Centre Partys results. When the economic variables have signiÞcant
coeﬃcients in the regression of the left-wing parties, the signs are negative
and levels of signiÞcance relatively low (0.1). Reason may be in the Social
Democratic Partys long incumbency, which was interrupted only in 1991-94
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by the right-wing government.
Political and economic dummy variables inßuenced signiÞcantly only the
popularity of the Social Democratic Party. The change of the Prime Minister
increased the Social Democratic Partys popularity. The party popularities
were hurt by incumbency without exceptions. The Moderate Party holding
the Prime Ministers post in 1991-94 is punished stronger than its coalition
partner, the Centre Party. In several regressions the most signiÞcant ex-
planatory variable is the lagged popularity. These results for Sweden are in
line with the results in Lybeck (1985). The party popularities are changed
by something else than the economy. Thus, we can conclude that in Sweden
it is no use for the incumbents to create political business cycles since the
poll respondents (and thus, the voters) are not aﬀected by the economy.
3.2.3 Comparison of the Results
All in all, there are Þve signiÞcant economic variable coeﬃcients in the
Finnish results for the whole period and 2 in the Swedish results. The
same relation in the subperiod coeﬃcients is 9 to 7. When we compare
the sister-parties, we Þnd that the Left Alliance and the National Coalition
are more strongly inßuenced by the economy than the Left Party and the
Moderate Party. The Social Democratic Parties are both aﬀected by the
economy but in diﬀerent ways. The popularity of the Finnish SDP increases
along with unemployment and is not signiÞcantly inßuenced by inßation,
whereas the popularity of the Swedish sister-party is negatively inßuenced
by both but only inßation has signiÞcant coeﬃcient. The Centre Parties in
neither countries are inßuenced by the economy when the whole data set
used in the estimations.
The periodwise examination shows that in the Finnish results unemploy-
ment has signiÞcant inßuence in 7 regressions and in the Swedish results in
4 regression (in most cases only barely signiÞcant). A closer look shows that
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not only the unemployment coeﬃcients for the Finnish parties are larger
but they are also statistically more signiÞcant. Inßation aﬀects signiÞcantly
in two whole period regressions of the Finnish parties and in one Swedish
party regression. Periodwise the situation is similar.
After all, the most striking result is that when we look at the statistically
signiÞcant inßuence of the economic variables during and after the depression
their inßuence is negative on the Finnish right-wing parties, but positive
on the Swedish ones. A similar pattern is found for the left-wing parties,
too. The Finnish left-wing parties are positively inßuenced by the economic
variables when they are statistically signiÞcant, whereas Swedish parties are
not. It looks like that the incumbents of the depression period are in Finland
severely punished for the policies, but in Sweden that is not the case. The
reason may lie in the size of the depression, the contents and the success of
the practiced policies.
The results are displayed in detail in the Appendix in Tables 4-11. Of
the regression results we report the coeﬃcients with their signiÞcances, stan-
dard errors and some test statistics. The results between seasonally adjusted
unemployment and non-seasonally adjusted unemployment did not crucially
diﬀer from each other. The results reported here are obtained using season-
ally adjusted unemployment rate.
3.3 Threshold Model
The results above show, as was expected, that the respondents evaluate the
parties with respect to the economy diﬀerently in diﬀerent periods. Another
interpretation of those results is that there is instability in the estimated
economic coeﬃcients. In the empirical popularity function literature, the
coeﬃcient instability has been raised to a central issue (e.g. Paldam, 1991,
Nannestad and Paldam, 1994). On one hand, it is the desired result, on the
other, it is a problem. How to connect these two sides of the coin?
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Above the subsamples were selected to match the electoral periods, which
is quite natural a choice in this context. Another aspect is to let the data
tell the subsample selection criteria. The unemployment rate seems to be
the most inßuential variable and its inßuence varies from period to period.
An obvious question is whether there exists a level of unemployment that
splits the observations into two regimes between which the inßuence of un-
employment alternates from positive to negative or from signiÞcant to non-
signiÞcant. In the search for the split point, we employ a threshold method
originally proposed by Tong (1983, 1990). This one threshold, one threshold
variable -model provides a simple nonlinear alternative6. Another advantage
is that the threshold is endogenous, i.e., it is estimated along with the other
parameters of the model. The general presentation of the threshold regres-
sion model is as follows
(2) yt =
Pk
i=1 β1ixit + et, qt−d ≤ γ,
(3) yt =
Pk
i=1 β2ixit + et, qt−d > γ.
The relationship between dependent (yt) and explanatory (xit) variables
is supposed to change according to the value (γ) of the threshold variable
(qt, here included in xit), et is the usual error term. H0 hypothesis is that
the threshold is not signiÞcant and all the β1is equal all the β2is, which
linearizes the model. In the estimation of the threshold model we apply a
Gauss procedure coded by Hansen7. It begins with the estimation of the
6In Asikainen (2000) we have tested the Þt of another nonlinear alternative, namely
Logistic Smooth Transition Regression (LSTR) (Granger and Teräsvirta, 1994). LSTR
was chosen because it assumes that small values of unemployment have diﬀerent kind of
eﬀect than large values. Also slow and smooth transition was considered as an advantage.
The applied LM-test (Lin and Teräsvirta, 1994) does not reject the assumption of linearity
mostly likely due to the small number of observations in the data set.
7Hansens Gauss code is available on his www-page. The code has been used at least
in Hansen (1996).
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whole data by OLS. After that the data is sorted in descending order accord-
ing to the threshold variable. This rearrangement transforms the threshold
model estimation into a change point model estimation. The threshold is
found by minimizing the sum of squared residuals (more precisely sample
variance). The OLS results include a test for residual heteroskedasticity
and according to the result of that test, the signiÞcance of the threshold is
tested either by F-test (homoskedastic errors) or the LM-test (heteroskedas-
tic errors). An essential part of the code is the calculation of bootstrap
probability values for the LM- and F-tests. Bootstraped values are needed
since the threshold is not identiÞed under the null hypothesis and thus, the
usual probability distributions are not applicable. After the threshold point
is found, the data is divided into two regimes. The two regimes are sepa-
rately estimated by OLS. In the interpretation of the results, attention is
paid to the p-values and the threshold coeﬃcients in the two regimes. The
threshold model has previously been applied to e.g. the models of separating
and multiple equilibria.
As said, we apply unemployment as the threshold variable. This popu-
larity equation diﬀers from the popularity function above (1) by excluding
the political, incumbency and trend variables as their inßuence on the pop-
ularity is not assumed to be aﬀected by the threshold. The exact threshold
model is speciÞed as follows,
(4) Pt = (α0 + α1Pt−1 + α2It−1 + α3Ut−1)I(Ut−d ≤
˜
U)
+(β0 + β1Pt−1 + β2It−1 + β3Ut−1)I(Ut−d >
˜
U) + εt
where I(·) is an indicator function, which gets value 1 when the condition
in the parentheses is true. d is the threshold lag, but other symbols are the
same as before. The basic hypotheses are that there is a threshold for
each party, it diﬀers from party to party and there are diﬀerences between
the countries in the results. If we specify further these hypotheses, we can
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reformulate the previously found results on the partisan divide. It is assumed
that in the regime of high unemployment the left-wing parties are positively
inßuenced by the unemployment and the right-wing parties are negatively
aﬀected. These assumptions follow the classic partisan hypothesis. What
comes to the diﬀerences between the countries, it is already quite obvious
that the popularities of the Swedish parties are not so expectedly-behaved
with respect to the economy as the Finnish parties popularities.
3.4 Results on the Threshold Model
The estimated thresholds are signiÞcant for the Social Democratic Party
and the Left Alliance, for the other two, the Centre Party and the National
Coalition, they are very close to signiÞcance with levels 0.1 and 0.12, respec-
tively (see Table 4.). The results are also otherwise similar for the left-wing
parties: in the presence of high unemployment (above 10.7 % for LA, 12.8
% for SDP), the popularity of the left-wing parties increases. The results of
the National Coalition and the Centre Party seem to be more mixed. The
results of the Centre Party, the National Coalition and the Social Demo-
cratic Party have one feature in common: when unemployment has negative
(positive) sign, so has inßation. The economic variables have either negative
or positive inßuence, but the inßuence of inßation and unemployment goes
to the same direction.
For the National Coalition, unemployment has to climb high (15.1%)
in order to lose its signiÞcant negative inßuence on the partys popularity,
below that it has negative inßuence. Comparison of the plots of the unem-
ployment and the National Coalitions popularity ratings reveals, that when
unemployment is above 15.1%, the popularity of the National Coalition is
at its so far lowest levels. Thus, it might be reasonable to assume that at
that time there are only the core supporters left - those who believe in the
values of the party and are not shaked by the bad economy. For the Cen-
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tre Party, unemployments inßuence on the popularity turns negative above
12.2%. When unemployment rate lies between 12.2% and 15.1%, both un-
employment and inßation have negative inßuence on the right-wing parties.
During most of their shared incumbency period, the unemployment rate was
on that level.
In general, when the economic variables have signiÞcant coeﬃcient, their
level of signiÞcancy is always high (0.01). One feature in these results that
Þts all parties except the National Coalition, is that when unemployment is
below the thresholds, it has not signiÞcant inßuence and the coeﬃcients are
close to zero. In Table 4. are the threshold values and their signiÞcances for
the Finnish parties.
Table 4. Values of the threshold points for diﬀerent parties, LM-test for het-
eroskedastic errors, F-test for homoskedastic errors and their bootstrap p-values.
Party Threshold LM/F-test p-value
NC 15.1 15.35 (F) 0.10
CENT 12.2 14.92 (F) 0.12
SDP 12.8 34.98 (F) 0.00
LA 10.7 48.87 (F) 0.00
The Þrst look at the Swedish results tells that the thresholds have lower
value than the corresponding Finnish ones. The second look shows the next
contrast: the thresholds are not on any conventional level signiÞcant for
the left-wing parties. Further comparison tells that the threshold points
in the Finnish results are higher than the Swedish unemployment ever was
in this period. In addition, the large autoregressive term may absorb the
inßuence of any other variables. Else that can meaningfully be concluded
is that be it low or high unemployment seems not to be the driving factor
behind party fortunes in Sweden. The threshold values for each party and
their signicances are found in Table 5. Detailed results on the threshold
estimations are listed in the Appendix in Tables 12-21.
21
Table 5. Values of the threshold points for diﬀerent parties, LM-test for het-
eroskedastic errors, F-test for homoskedastic errors and their bootstrap p-values.
Party Threshold LM/F-test p-value
MP 8.3 17.07 (F) 0.06
CENT 2.0 16.97 (LM) 0.00
SDP 3.4 9.41 (LM) 0.27
LP 7.6 15.02 (F) 0.11
4 Conclusions
In this study we have searched an answer to the question: What happens
to the party popularities when changes in unemployment are exceptionally
large? Our data set provides excellent material for shedding some light on
this question. As expected the results diﬀer between Finland and Sweden.
The Finnish and Swedish sister-parties are inßuenced in opposite ways by
the economy. The Swedish left-wing parties (the Social Democratic Party,
the Left Party) are negatively aﬀected by unemployment and inßation but
the Finnish equivalents (the Social Democratic Party, the Left Alliance) are
positively inßuenced by the same variables. The popularity of the Finnish
right-wing parties (the Centre Party, the National Coalition) decreases when
unemployment and inßation increases, but in Sweden the Moderate Partys
popularity increases along with unemployment. It is tempting to conclude
that governing during the deepest phase of the depression characterizes the
results. The Finnish incumbents of 1991-95 are still not believed to be
able to take care of the economy, but in Sweden trust in the incumbents of
1991-94 is stronger. Reasons for the diﬀerences may lie in the diﬀerences
in the deepness of the depression, diﬀerences in the contents and timing
of the economic policy decisions. In Sweden, most of the public sector
saving decisions and cuts in transfers were made in 1994-95 by the Social
Democratic government, whereas in Finland most of the cuts and public
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sector saving decisions were made earlier by the right-wing government.
A threshold model is Þtted to the Finnish and Swedish popularity func-
tions to see if there are split points in the inßuence of the unemployment
on the party popularities. Popularities of the Finnish left-wing parties be-
have similarly with respect to unemployment, whereas the popularities of
the right-wing parties act similarly only when they are government coalition
partners. Overall, unemployment needs to be high (11-15%) to inßuence
signiÞcantly the Finnish party popularities, except the popularity of the Na-
tional Coalition whose popularity suﬀers from unemployment all the time.
When unemployment is high (above 11-13%), it increases the left-wing par-
ties popularities. Indeed, the Swedish results are much more diﬃcult to
interpret and conclude. Either the threshold are not signiÞcant (the Left
Party, the Social Democratic Party) or the number of observations in the
regimes is very low (the Centre Party, the Moderate Party). Maybe the large
autoregressive term in the Swedish popularity function estimations absorbs
the inßuence of the other variables. Maybe the unemployment never rose
high enough to reveal the thresholds in the Swedish popularity functions.
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Appendix
Table 1. Political variables, acronyms and deÞnitions for Finnish data.
Acronym DeÞnitions of Dummy Variables Timing Obs.
CPLCENT Change of party leader, Cent 6/1990 29
ECUFIX Markka Þxed to Ecu 6/1991 41
CSU Attempted coup in Soviet Union 8/1991 42
EUAPPL Application of membership in EU 3/1992 49
FIMFLO Markka to ßoat 9/1992 54
MEL Municipal elections, SDP won 10/1992 56
CPLSDP Change of party leader, SDP 6/1993 63
CPLNC Change of party leader, NC 8/1994 76
REFEU Referendum on EU membership 10/1994 77
10/96 Municipal elections 10/1996 98
10/96 Markka Þxed to ERM 10/1996 98
10/96 SDP Minister suspected on info
leaks on ERM decision 10/1996 98
LAD LA disunion on EMU 12/1997 110
CPLLA Change of party leader, LA 5/1998 116
LREF Labour market reform, Cent 11/1998 122
HU Party leaders sabbatical, Cent 4/2000 136
Table 2. Political variables, acronyms and deÞnitions for Swedish data.
Acronym DeÞnitions of Dummy Variables Timing Obs.
CPLCENT Change of party leader, Cent 6/1987 2
GCRISIS Government crisis 2/1990 32
ECUFIX Krona Þxed to Ecu 5/1991 44
EUAPPL Membership application to EU 7/1991 46
KROFLO Krona to ßoat 11/1992 60
PLGCENT Party leader left govt, Cent 8/1994 80
REFEU Referendum on EU membership 11/1994 82
EUPEL European Parliament election 9/1995 91
MONA Minister has credit problems, SDP 10/1995 93
CPMSDP Change of PM, SDP 3/1996 97
NEMUSDP Govt says no to EMU, SDP 6/1997 111
CPLCENT98 Change of party leader, Cent 6/1998 122
CPLMP Change of party leader, MP 8/1999 135
List of all tested economic variables which turned out to have nonsignif-
icant inßuence: inßation measured as consumer price index and consumer
price index for food, consumer conÞdence index, base rate, 3-month rate,
share price index, government debt, employment rate.
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Table 3. Acronyms and their deÞnitions used in all the tables.
Acronym DeÞnition
cons constant
(t-n) identiÞes the lag
GD government dummy
trend declining trend variable
U(t-n) unemployment
I(t-n) inßation (cost of living index)
R2 rate of explanation
LM residual autocorrelation
Normal residual normality
White residual heteroskedasticity
RESET functional form (Ramsey)
FINNISH RESULTS
Table 4. Results of popularity function for the Left Alliance1.
LA W I II III
cons 6.52*** 11.86*** 5.68*** 4.98***
[0.54] [3.76] [1.37] [1.3]
LA(t-1) -0.13 0.07 0.43***
[0.20] [0.14] [0.11]
GD9599 -0.26
[0.17]
GD99- 1.04***
[0.17]
Trend 0.14*** 0.19***
[0.01] [0.05]
U(t-3) 0.16*** -0.78 0.15** -0.01
[0.03] [0.80] [0.06] [0.06]
I (t-1) 0.13* -0.15 0.29 0.15
[0.07] [0.31] [0.2] [0.12]
R2 0.74 0.74 0.23 0.32
LM 0.04 0.01 2.35 0.89
Normal 3.94 2.31 0.41 0.69
White 0.98 1.15 0.89 0.85
RESET 6.27** 2.01 1.05 0.74
1Rejection levels are marked with stars as follows: * 0.1 , ** 0.05, *** 0.01.
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Table 5. Results of popularity function for the Social Democratic Party.
SDP W I II III
cons 7.4*** 23.88*** 0.24 12.63***
[1.39] [7.4] [1.94] [2.73]
SDP(t-1) 0.49*** 0.346* 0.70*** 0.38***
[0.07] [0.18] [0.08] [0.12]
GD8791 1.86***
[0.60]
GD9599 -1.63***
[0.38]
GD99- -0.51
[0.35]
CPLSDP 2.18*
[1.26]
EUAPPL -2.21*
[1.26]
U(t-2) 0.49*** -1.24* 0.47*** 0.21
[0.1] [0.69] [0.14] [0.13]
I (t-1) 0.1 -0.75 0.84** -0.11
[0.15] [0.47] [0.33] [0.22]
R2 0.87 0.26 0.92 0.41
LM 0.82 0.43 0.19 0.5
Normal 2.42 0.55 6.46** 1.48
White 0.28 0.28 0.09 0.90
RESET 10.42*** 0.25 1.52 0.06
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Table 6. Results of popularity function for the Centre Party.
CENT W I II III
cons 6.42*** 22.44*** 15.42*** 13.28***
[1.44] [6.27] [4.16] [2.88]
CENT(t-1) 0.74*** 0.15 0.39*** 0.51***
[0.05] [0.19] [0.13] [0.11]
GD9195 -0.77***
[0.26]
10/96 2.76** 2.69***
[1.10] [0.99]
WREF -1.87* -2.16**
[1.10] [0.99]
U(t-2) -0.06 -1.48** -0.29** -0.21**
[0.05] [0.65] [0.11] [0.01]
I (t-1) -0.03 0.2 -0.09 0.16
[0.11] [0.42] [0.25] [0.18]
R2 0.81 0.77 0.84 0.67
LM 4.99*** 0.60 0.88 2.79*
Normal 0.53 0.98 3.14 0.71
White 0.49 1.41 0.30 1.09
RESET 0.23 0.71 1.4 0.18
Table 7. Results of popularity function for the National Coalition.
NC W I II III
cons 10.54*** 18.69*** 10.84*** 22.77***
[1.99] [5.30] [2.46] [4.77]
NC(t-1) 0.62*** 0.13 0.34*** 0.29**
[0.07] [0.18] [0.12] [0.13]
10/96 0.39
[0.49]
U(t-1) -0.21*** 0.45 -0.002 -0.62***
[0.05] [0.58] [0.06] [0.17]
I (t-1) -0.4*** -0.48 0.28 -0.88***
[0.11] [0.37] [0.18] [0.27]
R2 0.69 0.67 0.51 0.57
LM 6.87*** 1.12 0.15 4.12**
Normal 1.40 3.66 4.18 4.26
White 1.70 0.27 0.35 1.75
RESET 1.38 1.1 0.08 0.02
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SWEDISH RESULTS
Table 8. Results of popularity function for the Left Party.
LP W I II III
cons 0.61 2.95** -0.19 2.99**
[0.43] [1.34] [0.82] [1.24]
LP(t-1) 0.95*** 0.66*** 0.98*** 0.81***
[0.02] [0.12] [0.05] [0.07]
U(t-2) 0.002 -1.04* 0.08 -0.09
[0.04] [0.52] [0.09] [0.09]
I (t-1) -0.05 0.11 -0.02 -0.12
[0.04] [0.10] [0.06] [0.11]
R2 0.94 0.78 0.89 0.71
LM 2.29 1.97 6.09*** 0.21
Normal 26.68*** 3.27 32.99*** 2.82
White 1.85* 0.56 2.4** 0.62
RESET 8.67*** 1.69 8.34*** 3.02*
Table 9. Results of popularity function for the Social Democratic Party.
SDP W I II III
cons 8.13*** 10.65* 2.18 7.74***
[1.73] [5.55] [2.45] [2.71]
SDP(t-1) 0.87*** 0.77*** 1.01*** 0.79***
[0.03] [0.10] [0.05] [0.07]
GD8791 -1.69**
[0.68]
GD9498 -2.20***
[0.61]
GD98- -2.61***
[0.65]
CPMSDP 4.61*** 4.39***
[1.59] [1.47]
MONA -3.26** -3.61**
[1.58] [1.49]
U(t-2) -0.16 0.95 -0.34* -0.08
[0.13] [0.98] [0.18] [0.13]
I (t-1) -0.15* -0.49* -0.13 0.14
[0.08] [0.25] [0.12] [0.17]
R2 0.94 0.91 0.94 0.70
LM 1.7 0.52 0.26 0.65
Normal 3.59 2.66 0.33 2.53
White 0.52 0.34 1.69 0.39
RESET 1.82 0.11 0.95 0.008
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Table 10. Results of popularity function for the Centre Party.
CENT W I II III
cons 1.22*** 6.42*** 3.19*** 0.98**
[0.41] [2.29] [0.94] [0.43]
CENT(t-1) 0.83*** 0.61*** 0.45*** 0.72***
[0.05] [0.13] [0.11] [0.10]
GD9194 -0.031
[0.18]
U(t-2) -0.04 -1.29* 0.054 0.08
[0.04] [0.67] [0.07] [0.07]
I (t-1) 0.06 -0.03 0.14** 0.13
[0.04] [0.10] [0.05] [0.09]
R2 0.86 0.61 0.58 0.69
LM 3.1** 0.04 1.32 0.37
Normal 45.43*** 4.11 4.72 4.57
White 2.28** 0.74 1.12 1.85
RESET 1.79 0.24 0.41 0.00
Table 11. Results of popularity function for the Moderate Party.
MP W I II III
cons 2.5*** 2.73 0.78 3.81**
[0.82] [2.76] [1.71] [1.49]
MP(t-1) 0.86*** 0.72*** 0.91*** 0.76***
[0.04] [0.15] [0.06] [0.07]
GD9194 -0.99***
[0.34]
U(t-2) 0.20*** 0.21 0.14 0.41***
[0.07] [0.89] [0.10] [0.15]
I (t-1) 0.04 0.43* 0.07 0.14
[0.04] [0.24] [0.07] [0.14]
R2 0.90 0.80 0.81 0.83
LM 0.76 0.59 2.52* 0.67
Normal 0.51 0.99 2.47 2.79
White 1.199 1.39 1.08 3.59***
RESET 0.004 0.23 0.48 2.31
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THRESHOLD MODEL RESULTS
Table 12. P-values for threshold existence under diﬀerent assumptions
on residuals (H0 no threshold).
FIN LM het. errors F hom. errors
NC 0.17 0.1
CENT 0.18 0.12
SDP 0.00 0.00
LA 0.00 0.00
Table 13. P-values for threshold existence under diﬀerent assumptions
on residuals (H0 no threshold).
SWE LM het. errors F hom. errors
MP 0.29 0.06
CENT 0.00 0.00
SDP 0.27 0.42
LP 0.1 0.1
FINNISH RESULTS
Table 14. Results of the threshold model for the Left Alliance2.
LA global U ≤ 10.7 U > 10.7
cons 2.79*** 3.01*** 5.57***
[0.75] [1.23] [0.99]
LA(t-1) 0.71*** 0.82*** -0.07
[0.06] [0.06] [0.13]
U(t-1) -0.01 -0.09 0.26***
[0.03] [0.07] [0.06]
I (t-1) 0.02 -0.14 0.08
[0.07] [0.11] [0.12]
R2 0.59 0.73 0.33
N 150 80 70
P 0.58
2Rejection levels are marked with stars as follows: * 0.1 , ** 0.05, *** 0.01.
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Table 15. Results of the threshold model for the SDP.
SDP global U ≤ 12.8 U > 12.8
cons 2.61*** 13.51*** -1.89
[0.99] [2.39] [2.14]
SDP(t-1) 0.74*** 0.44*** 0.47***
[0.05] [0.09] [0.12]
U(t-1) 0.27*** -0.02 1.03***
[0.07] [0.09] [0.29]
I (t-1) 0.38*** -0.09 0.86***
[0.13] [0.15] [0.24]
R2 0.85 0.22 0.88
N 150 101 49
P 0.99
Table 16. Results of the threshold model for the Centre Party.
CENT global U ≤ 12.2 U > 12.2
cons 5.47*** 3.9*** 21.4***
[1.45] [1.48] [4.91]
CENT(t-1) 0.81*** 0.79*** 0.36
[0.04] [0.06] [0.14]
U(t-1) -0.1*** 0.05 -0.55***
[0.04] [0.09] [0.16]
I (t-1) -0.12 0.11 -0.73***
[0.1] [0.16] [0.25]
R2 0.78 0.66 0.69
N 150 98 52
P 0.72
Table 17. Results of the threshold model for the National Coalition.
NC global U ≤ 15.1 U > 15.1
cons 10.57*** 13.08*** 7.34*
[1.98] [2.34] [4.29]
NC(t-1) 0.61*** 0.54*** 0.25
[0.06] [0.07] [0.24]
U(t-1) -0.21*** -0.26*** 0.31
[0.05] [0.07] [0.22]
I (t-1) -0.4*** -0.54*** 0.24
[0.11] [0.14] [0.24]
R2 0.69 0.61 0.273
N 150 123 27
P 0.72
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SWEDISH RESULTS
Table 18. Results of the threshold model for the Left Party.
LP global U ≤ 7.6 U > 7.6
cons 0.81* 0.04 2.39***
[0.41] [0.44] [3.55]
LP(t-1) 0.95*** 0.97*** 0.84***
[0.02] [0.02] [0.05]
U(t-1) -0.02 0.09*** -0.1
[0.04] [0.02] [0.39]
I (t-1) -0.06* -0.01 -0.22
[0.03] [0.03] [0.14]
R2 0.94 0.95 0.96
N 155 123 32
P 0.54
Table 19. Results of the threshold model for the SDP.
SDP global U ≤ 3.4 U > 3.4
cons 1.48 10.73** 2.28**
[0.95] [5.27] [1.11]
SDP(t-1) 0.96*** 0.77*** 0.95***
[0.02] [0.09] [0.03]
U(t-1) 0.003 0.74 -0.07
[0.07] [0.49] [0.1]
I (t-1) 0.005 -0.48** 0.15
[0.05] [0.22] [0.11]
R2 0.93 0.93 0.93
N 155 47 108
P 0.84
Table 20. Results of the threshold model for the Center Party.
CENT global U ≤ 2.0 U > 2.0
cons 1.33*** 3.44* 1.35***
[0.35] [2.06] [0.36]
CENT(t-1) 0.83*** 0.66*** 0.63***
[0.045] [0.12] [0.07]
U(t-1) -0.05 0.13 0.1***
[0.03] [0.77] [0.04]
I (t-1) 0.05 0.006 0.13***
[0.03] [0.07] [0.04]
R2 0.86 0.49 0.77
N 155 35 120
P 0.03
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Table 21. Results of the threshold model for the Moderate Party.
MP global U ≤ 8.3 U > 8.3
cons 1.56** 2.46*** -23.52*
[0.75] [0.77] [12.66]
MP(t-1) 0.92*** 0.87*** 1.19***
[0.02] [0.03] [0.12]
U(t-1) 0.06 0.09 2.15*
[0.06] [0.07] [1.27]
I (t-1) -0.002 0.01 0.18
[0.04] [0.04] [0.31]
R2 0.89 0.88 0.98
N 155 139 16
P 0.93
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